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Introduction
The explosion in media technology makes many of today's celeb-
rities immediately recognizable. This allows them, if they choose, to
capitalize on their identifiability beyond their artistic mediums
through advertisements and endorsements.' Whether or not a celeb-
rity does so, the celebrity has an understandable interest in barring
others from profiting from the recognition value he has created.2
The law has not always protected the exclusive right of a celebrity
to control the commercial exploitation of his personality and talents.'
Today, however, society views celebrity as a "commodity" or "prop-
erty."4 As a result of this evolution, many states now recognize a ce-
lebrity's "right of publicity" by common law, statute, or both.5
Even when recognized, however, the content of the right of pub-
licity often remains uncertain and its limits unclear.6 This is particu-
larly true in California for several reasons. First, development of the
right of publicity in California has been "spasmodic,"7 springing from,
and remaining intertwined with, the California common law right of
1. As former Chief Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court observed:
Today, it is commonplace for individuals to promote or advertise... products or
... even have their identities infused in the products. Individuals prominent in
athletics, business, entertainment and the arts, for example, are frequently in-
volved in such enterprises.... As a result, the sale of one's persona in connection
with the promotion of commercial products has unquestionably become big
business....
Such commercial use of an individual's identity is intended to increase the
value or sales of the product by fusing the celebrity's identity with the product
and thereby siphoning some of the publicity value or good will in the celebrity's
persona into the product. This use is premised, in part, on public recognition and
association with that person's name or likeness, or an ability to create such
recognition.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 437-38 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
2. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,210-
11 (1954). Cf. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 439 n.11 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (unauthorized use also
infringes on the celebrity's efforts "to control the public projection of... identity, includ-
ing the desire for solitude and anonymity").
3. See Nimmer, supra note 2, at 204.
4. George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51
LA. L. REV. 443, 444 (1991).
5. The right of publicity is "the right of each person to control and profit from the
publicity values which he has created or purchased." Nimmer, supra note 2, at 216.
6. Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1590 (1979).
7. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 439 n.14 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissent-
ing) ("spasmodic" development attributable to treatment of right of publicity claims as
right of privacy claims).
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privacy.8 Second, California legislation has been piecemeal,9 driven
by the courts' failure to provide remedies for specific instances of
commercial exploitation.10 Under the resulting statutory scheme, liv-
ing celebrities and non-celebrities enjoy the same personal rights,"
but only celebrities enjoy descendible property rights in the attributes
of their personalities.
12
Finally, the California Supreme Court has never faced a novel
infringement of celebrity publicity rights. In fact, California appellate
courts have yet to consider a complaint for the unauthorized use of
anything other than a celebrity's name, photograph, or likeness.' 3
Plaintiffs have filed the bulk of recent actions to which California law
applies in federal courts on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.' 4 As a
result, federal courts have been left to determine state law.
Two recent Ninth Circuit cases in which the California right of
publicity was at issue took a broad view of the common law right,
while interpreting the statutory right narrowly. In Waits v. Frito-Lay,
Inc. ,'1 the court upheld an award of damages against Frito-Lay for
appropriating, by impersonation, singer Tom Waits's voice.' 6 In White
v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,"7 the court preserved enter-
tainer Vanna White's common law claim against Samsung for using a
"Vanna White" robot in its ads. At the same time, it affirmed the
district court's dismissal of White's statutory cause of action.' 8
8. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983) (applying
privacy precedents in adjudicating right of publicity claim).
9. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the As-
sociative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1223 (1986) ("California's piecemeal
attack ... will make it ... more difficult for the courts ... effectively to articulate the
values and interests around which this area of the law must function and thus will generate
the 'bad law' that inevitably flows from 'hard cases."').
10. See infra notes 59, 80.
11. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1993).
12. Id. § 990.
13. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1402 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993) (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
14. This is true of all claims for appropriation of actual voice or imitation of voice in
which California law has been applied. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513, 1514 (1992); Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Motown Record Corp.
v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Davis v. Trans World
Airlines, 297 F. Supp. 1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
15. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993). Waits asserted a
common law right of publicity claim. See infra text accompanying notes 128-52.
16. Id. at 1112.
17. 971 F.2d at 1399. See infra text accompanying notes 153-88.
18. Id. at 1397.
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TWo assumptions about California common law guided these fed-
eral court decisions. The first assumption is that California courts rec-
ognize a right of publicity that encompasses a celebrity's "identity,"' 9
unlike the California statute, which is expressly limited to commercial
appropriation of specific attributes. The second assumption is that
California courts recognize this interest in "identity" as a property
right, rather than a personal right.2" Neither assumption, however, is
supported by California state court decisions.
This Note discusses this divergence in "California" law. Part I
describes the evolution of the right of publicity. Part II summarizes
the California statutory rights and the status of California common
law based on California appellate court cases. Part III illustrates the
Ninth Circuit's view of the California common law right of publicity as
synthesized in Waits and White. Part IV measures Waits and White
against the historical background of the right of publicity, California
precedents, and policy considerations (suggesting that California
courts would sustain Waits's claim, but would dismiss White's). Part
V urges legislative action to discourage forum shopping by clearly de-
fining the substance of the California right of publicity.
I
Evolution of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity grew out of and often remains linked with
the right of privacy. One American decision noted a right of privacy
as early as 1867.21 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, however, are
traditionally credited 22 as the first to argue for the recognition of inva-
sion of privacy as a cause of action in tort in their landmark 1890 law
review article, The Right of Privacy.23
Their underlying premise was that everyone has a property inter-
est in the expressions of his own personality.24 They argued that
courts should extend this premise, which underscores copyright and
19. Id. at 1398-99.
20. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100. Property classification implies that the right is alienable
and inheritable. Armstrong, supra note 4, at 444.
21. Gringsby v. Breckenridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480 (1867). The significant issue in the
case was whether the author or the recipient of certain letters had a general property inter-
est in the letters. See Basil W. Kacedan, Note, The Right of Privacy, 12 B.U. L. REV. 353,
364-65 (1932), for a discussion of the case.
22. Leon R. Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and Limitations,
27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499, 501 (1952).
23. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
24. See id. at 198-202.
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patent law, to protect a person's privacy from invasion by the "too
enterprising press" or any "modern device for recording or reproduc-
ing sound."2 What was at risk to "modern enterprise and invention"
was the individual's mental composure.26 Therefore, while Warren
and Brandeis grounded their theory on personality as "property,"
they argued for recognition of the right of privacy as a personal
right-a right "to be let alone."27 The essence of the harm was the
injury to feelings.28
Seventy years later, Dean William Prosser synthesized over 400
right of privacy cases that had already been decided.29 Recognizing
that invasions of privacy interfered with different forms of the right
"to be let alone," he separated them into four separate torts.30 The
fourth tort, according to Prosser, involved "exploitation of attributes
of the plaintiff's identity" and consisted of the appropriation of a per-
son's name or likeness for another's advantage. 3'
Although he used name and likeness in defining "appropriation,"
Prosser's actual concern was with identifiability. Appropriation had
to be more than the unauthorized use of a person's name to be action-
able; it had to involve the use of the name "as a symbol of [the plain-
tiffs] identity."'32 At the same time, Prosser suggested appropriation
25. Id. at 205-06. "[Tlhe legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is ordinarily
termed the common-law right to intellectual and artistic property.., are applications of a
general right to privacy." Id. at 198.
26. Id. at 196. In this respect the protected interest was unlike that protected by copy-
right because the value was not in the right to take profits. Id. at 200. See also Roscoe
Pound, Interests in Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 363-64 (1915) ("A man's feelings are
as much a part of his personality as his limbs."). Feelings were part of the right to physical
integrity, one of the seven components of personality discussed by Pound. Id. at 355-56.
Among the other rights of personality Pound enumerated were the rights of property and
free industry. Id. at 353-54.
27. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 195. As a term of art, the right "to be let
alone" is attributed to Judge Cooley. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 29 (1879).
28. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 213, 219. The gist of a cause of action for
invasion of privacy is "a direct wrong of a personal character resulting in injury to the
feelings without regard to any effect which the publication may have on the property, busi-
ness, pecuniary interest, or the standing of the individual in the community." Fairfield v.
American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
29. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
30. Id. at 389. The four distinct torts were recognized by the California Supreme
Court in Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 921 n.16 (Cal. 1969) (en banc).
31. Prosser, supra note 29, at 401. The other three torts are (1) intrusion upon an-
other's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrass-
ing private facts about another; and (3) publicity which places another in a false light in the
public eye. Id. at 389. Right of privacy actions often involve more than one of Prosser's
torts. See, e.g., Fairfield, 291 P.2d 194.
32. Prosser, supra note 29, at 403-04. According to Prosser:
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of identity could occur without using either a person's name or like-
ness, "as by impersonation."33
Prosser recognized that an individual's interest in the "aspect[s]
of his identity" was more proprietary in nature than the mental inter-
est protected by his other three privacy torts.34 However, he found it
"pointless to dispute" whether the right was "property. '35 "If it is not,
it is at least, once it is protected by the law, a right of value upon
which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses. ' 36 "Appropria-
tion," as framed by Prosser, therefore encompassed both a personal
(mental) interest and a proprietary (commercial) interest.37
When someone uses the identity of a celebrity, however, the com-
mercial interest largely displaces the mental interest.3 8 A celebrity,
unlike a non-public figure, neither wishes to remain anonymous nor
experiences hurt feelings from publicity in general.39 Compared to
the private individual, whose mental interest is served by suppressing
publication, often the only question with the celebrity is "who gets to
do the publishing. '4° As a result, an unauthorized use of identity may
inflict solely economic harm.4'
Courts that understood privacy only in the sense of a personal
right "to be let alone" had difficulty recognizing this commercial inter-
It is when [the defendant] makes use of the name to pirate the plaintiff's identity
for some advantage of his own ... that he becomes liable.
On this basis, the question before the courts has been whether there has been
appropriation of an aspect of the plaintiff's identity. It is not enough that a name
which is the same as his is used ... unless the context or the circumstances, or the
addition of some other element indicate that the name is that of the plaintiff.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 401 n.155.
34. Id. at 406.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RiGrrs OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.8[A] (1988).
Prosser's combination of the interests has often been criticized as a source of confusion in
the law. E.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
1983).
38. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1974).
39. As Melville Nimmer noted:
Well known personalities ... do not seek the "solitude and privacy" which Bran-
deis and Warren sought to protect. Indeed, privacy is the only thing they do "not
want or need." Their concern is rather with publicity, which may be regarded as
the reverse side of the coin of privacy. However, although the well known per-
sonality does not wish to hide his light under a bushel of privacy, neither does he
wish to have his name, photograph, and likeness reproduced and publicized with-
out his consent or without remuneration to him.
Nimmer, supra note 2, at 203-04 (footnotes omitted). See also infra note 46.
40. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (emphasis
added).
41. See id. at 573; Carson, 698 F.2d at 835; Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 824.
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est. 42 They struggled to apply traditional privacy theory when well-
known persons sued for unauthorized use of their names or like-
nesses.43 As a result, courts often denied recovery, reasoning that
those who voluntarily chose public exposure could not claim mental
distress.'
The Second Circuit was the first to separate the commercial inter-
est in appropriation from the mental interest. In Haelan Laboratories
v. Topps Chewing Gum,45 Judge Jerome Frank called this independent
right to control and profit from celebrity the "right of publicity.
46
Like Prosser, Judge Frank found it "immaterial" whether the
right was "labeled a 'property' right., 47 Commentators who champi-
oned the Haelan decision and urged widespread recognition of the
right of publicity, however, regarded its classification as property to be
essential.48 They reasoned that if the right of publicity were a per-
sonal right, like privacy, it would not be assignable. 49 Any licensee of
a celebrity's name or likeness therefore could not enforce the license,
reducing its commercial value." Commentators also argued that the
right of publicity would expire at death if not classified as property,
leaving a celebrity's heirs powerless to prevent exploitation of the
deceased. 1
42. MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 1.6.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
46. Id. at 868. In Haelan, a baseball player gave two competing bubble gum compa-
nies "exclusive" agreements to use his photograph. When the first sued the second to
enforce its exclusive rights, the defendant argued that the contracts represented only re-
leases of the liability each would have incurred to the baseball player for invasion of pri-
vacy had they otherwise used his photograph. Since the right of privacy is a personal right,
the defendant contended the contract was not effective as an assignment and the plaintiff
had no standing to sue. The court rejected these arguments, holding that the baseball
player had assigned a right distinguishable from the right of privacy. The court reasoned:
We think that, in addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy.., a man
has a right ... to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture .... This
right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common knowledge that
many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having
their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel
sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertise-
ments.... This right of publicity would usually yield.., no money unless it could
be made the subject of an exclusive grant....
Id.
47. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
48. Nimmer, supra note 2, at 216.
49. Id.
50. See id. See also supra note 46; infra note 79.
51. See generally Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality
and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553, 599-605 (1960) (describing the issues involved with
descendibility).
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The right of publicity is a creature of state law and each state
defines the right differently.52 States have recognized it either (1) by
common law only; (2) by statute that codifies and supplants the com-
mon law; or (3) by statute that supplements common law, as in Cali-
fornia.53 Some states have accepted commentators' arguments and
recognize an independent property right, whether or not they actually
call it a right of publicity.54 In other states, the right remains a per-
sonal right bundled with the right of privacy.55 The California right,
while based on Prosser's tort of appropriation, is a patchwork of both
approaches.
II
California Rights as Defined by California Courts
and the California Legislature
California courts recognized the common law right of privacy in
193156 and the common law right of publicity in 1979."7 In 1971, the
52. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977). TWo
principal considerations limit the extent of the right of publicity. The most important
countervailing influence is the First Amendment. Armstrong, supra note 4, at 467. Be-
cause this Note focuses on potentially deceptive advertising, which enjoys little or no First
Amendment protection, potential First Amendment issues are not discussed. However,
the Supreme Court, in its one and only right of publicity case, specifically noted that the
case did not "merely assert that some general use, such as advertising, was made of [the
plaintiff's] name or likeness," in holding that the First Amendment did not bar the plain-
tiff's claim. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 n.10.
The other factor limiting the expansiveness of the right of publicity is the rights of
others who contribute to the performance. Armstrong, supra note 4, at 467. Copyright law
often, but not always, protects the interests of third persons. Id.; see, e.g., Motown Record
Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1240-41 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (right of
publicity preempted by Copyright Act in action based on advertisement in which singing
style and appearance of The Supremes was imitated).
53. Leonard A. Wohl, Note, The Right of Publicity and Vocal Larceny: Sounding Off
on Sound-Alikes, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 445, 450-51 n.53 (1988).
54. Compare Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (recogniz-
ing right of publicity as property right) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (1984) (recog-
nizing property right in use of name, photograph, and likeness without referring to right of
publicity).
55. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1984).
56. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). While the case was later
pointed to as the seminal California right of privacy decision, the Melvin court avoided use
of the term in its holding. The court also did not tie its decision to the precepts espoused
by Warren and Brandeis, but tied it instead to the inalienable right guaranteed by the
California Constitution "to pursue and obtain happiness." Id. at 93. The court said: "The
right of privacy as recognized in a number of states has been defined as... 'the right to live
one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarranted and undesired publicity. In
short, it is the right to be let alone."' Id. at 92 (citations omitted). However, the court was
"loath to conclude that the right of privacy as the foundation for an action in tort, in the
form known and recognized in other jurisdictions, exist[ed] in California." Id. at 93.
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legislature "complemented" common law5" by creating a statutory
cause of action for specific forms of commercial appropriation.59 The
legislature amended the statute in 1984, adding a separate action that
the heirs or assignees of deceased celebrities could assert.6°
"Whether we call this a right of privacy or give it any other name is immaterial, because it
is a right guaranteed by our Constitution that must not be ruthlessly and needlessly in-
vaded by others." Id. at 93-94. Over 40 years later, in November 1974, the California
Constitution was amended to include "pursuing and obtaining... privacy" as an inaliena-
ble right. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
Despite its variant underpinnings, Melvin, like Warren and Brandeis, focused on the
right to be let alone and the mental interest affected by the intrusion or appropriation.
Melvin, 297 P. at 93. The right of privacy was not recognized by the California Supreme
Court until 1952, in Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952).
Later courts, influenced by Prosser, increasingly noted both the mental and commer-
cial interests in appropriation. See, e.g., Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Ct. App.
1969) (university professor's damage award based on commercial value of lecture notes
published under his name without consent); Stilson v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 104 Cal.
Rptr. 581 (Ct. App. 1972) (plaintiffs have right to show financial detriment, as well as
mental anguish, for commercial exploitation of name).
57. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (en banc). As the Melvin
court before it did with the "right of privacy," the Lugosi majority eschewed use of the
term "right of publicity" in its holding. However, shortly thereafter, in Guglielmi v. Spell-
ing-Goldberg Productions, 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979) (en banc), the California Supreme
Court said: "In Lugosi, we hold that the right of publicity protects against the unauthor-
ized use of one's name, likeness or personality ......
58. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428 n.6.
59. Act of Nov. 22, 1971, ch. 1595, 1971 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344). Although New York, in particular, had enacted right-to-privacy legislation
as early as 1903, California's original efforts were unsuccessful. A 1939 bill (A.B. 2004),
patterned after the New York privacy statute, passed unanimously in both California
houses, but was vetoed by the governor. Robert B. Miller, Note, Commercial Appropria-
tion of An Individual's Name, Photograph or Likeness: A New Remedy for Californians, 3
PAC. L.J. 651, 652 n.3 (1972). The legislature did not resurrect the effort until 1971.
"The purpose of the [1971] bill, A.B. 826, was to crack down on sales schemes in which
a manufacturer or retailer randomly selected a person's name and used it to promote a
particular product." REPORT OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., S.B.
613, as amended May 9, 1984 (unpublished report, copy on file with Assembly Republican
Caucus Library). The legislative history "characterized the problem presented as an 'inva-
sion of privacy.' . . . [T]here is no mention in the legislative documents of the right of
publicity or the economic interest protected thereunder." Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 443 n.23
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
60. Act of Sept. 30, 1984, ch. 1704, 1984 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 990, 3344). Although nothing in the 1971 legislative history mentions the right of
publicity, at least one commentator at the time of § 3344's adoption hypothesized that the
legislation might create a right of publicity for the personal identities of celebrities and
non-celebrities alike. Miller, supra note 59, at 662-63. By the time § 3344 was amended,
this view was shared by the legislature: "The California legislature enacted Civil Code
section 3344 in 1971, codifying a portion of the right of publicity and according statutory
recognition to the previous common law evolution of that right." Memorandum to the
California Assembly Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 14, 1984) (unpublished memorandum, copy-on
file with Assembly Republican Caucus Library). According to the amendment's author,
the 1971 legislation "recognize[d] the right of living celebrities to protect against the unau-




1. Civil Code Section 3344
Civil Code section 3344 protects both celebrities and non-celebri-
ties from unauthorized commercial appropriation, although it does
not refer to the rights it creates as either rights of publicity or rights of
privacy.6' The statute, however, implicitly emphasizes the proprietary
interest in being free from commercial exploitation over the mental
interest in being "let alone.
62
Initially, section 3344 exclusively protected against unauthor-
ized63 use of name, photograph,64 and likeness.65 In 1984, the legisla-
ture added voice and signature.66
Section 3344 only protects against appropriation of these speci-
fied attributes to advertise or to sell goods or services,67 although use
existing rights of publicity enjoyed by living celebrities under current law and extend these
rights to their heirs for a period of 50 years beyond the death of the celebrity." Transmittal
letter from Senator William Campbell to Governor George Deukmejian (Aug. 31, 1984)
(on file with author).
61. See Stephen F. Rohde, Dracula: Still Undead, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1985, at 53.
62. The effect of this is that a non-celebrity, whose right to control the attributes of his
personality stems from his right "to be let alone," may sue under California law to recover
the economic benefits when another uses an attribute, such as his photograph, for that
person's advantage. James M. TReece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and
Personal Histories, 51 TEx. L. REV. 637, 652 (1973). At the same time, the celebrity, whose
principal interest may be in his commercial value, does not lose his "privacy" interest as
the statute is structured. He may assert injury to his feelings when the unauthorized use
has this effect. Id.
63. Consent, as under common law, may be written or oral and may result from a
course of conduct. Jerome E: Weinstein, Commercial Appropriation of Name or Likeness:
Section 3344 and the Common Law, L.A. BAR J., Mar. 1977, at 440. Section 3344 also
provides for a minor's consent by his parent or legal guardian. § 3344(a).
64. A "photograph" is "any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving,
or any videotape or live television transmission, of any person such that the person is read-
ily identifiable." § 3344(b). "A person shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a
photograph when one who views the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably deter-
mine that the person depicted in the photograph is the same person who is complaining of
its unauthorized use." § 3344(b)(1).
65. No case has directly construed the meaning of the word "likeness" under § 3344.
Nurmi v. Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775, 1777 (C.D. Cal. 1989). California right of privacy
and publicity actions "have implied that the term 'likeness' means an actual representation
of a person, rather than a close resemblance." Id.; see infra notes 95, 98.
66. Act of Sept. 30, 1984, ch. 1704, 1984 Cal. Stat. (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344(a)). "Voice" and "signature" were treated as "technical amendments," designed to
clarify "the intended purview of the right." REPORT OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
supra note 59, at 5. Earlier versions of the amendment extended coverage to a person's
"image," but the legislature removed this from the final version. A Senate report sug-
gested: "SHOULD NOT IMAGE BE DEFINED?" Id. at 4.
67. Consent is specifically not required to use a name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any
political campaign. § 3344(d).
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for advertising or sale of goods or services alone is not enough to
make an appropriation actionable. 61 There must be a "direct connec-
tion" between the use of the attribute and the commercial purpose.
69
The use also must be knowing7 -inadvertence or mistake is a com-
plete defense.71 The use, however, need not imply an endorsement to
be actionable.
Section 3344 provides for statutory damages equal to the greater
of $750 or actual damages.72 A successful plaintiff also can recover
any profits made by the infringer from the unauthorized use not in-
cluded in the actual damages. 73 As a result, a court can award dam-
ages measured by both the harm to the plaintiff and the profits to the
defendant.74 In addition, section 3344 provides for the award of puni-
tive damages and entitles the prevailing party to attorney's fees.75
These remedies are cumulative and in addition to others allowed by
law.76
The rights that section 3344 creates are personal, not property,
rights.77 As such, these rights do not appear to be assignable;7 there-
68. § 3344(e).
69. It is a question of fact whether the use is so directly connected with the commercial
sponsorship or with the paid advertising as to require consent. § 3344(e). If the use is not
substantially related to the pecuniary motive, or the particular use neither advances nor is
intended to advance that motive, there is no liability. Weinstein, supra note 63, at 440; see
also Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 381 (Ct. App. 1974).
70. The "knowing" requirement may flow from the penal damages provision in an
early version of the 1971 legislation. Its retention may be attributable to the minimum
damages provision. Miller, supra note 59, at 660.
71. Weinstein, supra note 63, at 433-34.
72. The author of the bill believed that a "minimum amount recoverable would ensure
that the average citizen, who cannot show that his name, photograph, or likeness has a
commercial value to the public, would recover more than nominal damages, which ... are
damages in name only and are the same as no damages at all." Miller, supra note 59, at 661
(citing Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1955)).
73. "In establishing such profits, the injured party or parties are required to present
proof only of the gross revenue attributable to such use, and the person who violated this
section is required to prove his or her deductible expenses." § 3344(a).
74. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 352 n.10 (Ct. App. 1983).
75. § 3344(a).
76. § 3344(g).
77. See Weinstein, supra note 63, at 435; see also infra note 117.
78. But see infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text. Section 990, the companion stat-
ute to § 3344 expressly characterizes the rights it creates on behalf of deceased celebrities
as "property rights, freely transferable." No similar provision appears in § 3344; in fact, the
legislature deleted a comparable provision from the 1984 amendment to § 3344. Commen-
tators suggest that "a strong argument can be made that a living personality cannot assign
or transfer the rights recognized under section 3344 during his lifetime." Rohde, supra
note 61, at 53; accord Halpern, supra note 9, at 1223 n.134.
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fore, a third party licensee of a protected attribute lacks standing to
sue. 7 9 Further, except as described below, the rights expire at death.
2. Civil Code Section 990
A separate section of the Civil Code, section 990,80 creates civil
liability for the unauthorized use of the attributes of a "deceased per-
sonality."'" It protects the name, photograph, voice, signature, and
likeness of such individuals against the same types of appropriations
found in section 3344.82 The damages available in an action under
section 990 are also the same as those allowed under section 3344.83
79. Nimmer described the consequences of non-assignability as follows:
[A]ny agreement purporting to grant the right to use the grantor's name and por-
trait (as in connection with a commercial endorsement or tie-up) is construed as
constituting merely a release as to the purchaser and as not granting the pur-
chaser any right which he can enforce as against a third party. Thus, if a promi-
nent motion picture actress should grant to a bathing suit manufacturer the right
to use her name and portrait in connection with its product and if subsequently a
competitive manufacturer should use the same actress's name and portrait in con-
nection with its product, the first manufacturer cannot claim any right of action
... against its competitor since the first manufacturer cannot claim to "own" the
actress's right [of publicity]. Assuming the second manufacturer acted with the
consent of the actress, it is possible that the first manufacturer would have a cause
of action for breach of contract against the actress, but this would present a rem-
edy in damages only and in some instances even recovery of damages might be
doubtful. Therefore, if a prominent person is found merely to have a personal
right.., and not a property right.., the important publicity values which he has
developed are greatly circumscribed and thereby reduced in value.
Nimmer, supra note 2, at 209-10 (citation omitted). But see supra note 46.
80. After the Lugosi decision, see infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text, which
held that a celebrity's right of publicity did not descend to his heirs, California State Sena-
tor William Campbell proposed a one paragraph amendment to § 3344 to nullify the deci-
sion by extending § 3344's existing protection for 50 years after a person's death and to
vest the ability to maintain a cause of action in the person's heirs. S.B. 613, 1983-84 Reg.
Sess. (1983). The legislation, which became known as the "dead celebrity bill," was
prompted by the Screen Actors Guild and supported by celebrities and heirs of deceased
celebrities. Rohde, supra note 61, at 53. The original amendment did not, however, distin-
guish between celebrities and non-celebrities. The Senate amended S.B. 613 twice; the
Assembly amended it six times. What was eventually enacted was a bifurcated statute that
made the additions to § 3344 described above, increased the available damages, and added
§ 990. The legislative history indicates that the modifications and resulting bifurcation of
S.B. 613 were done so that § 990 would expressly categorize the rights as property rights,
distinguishing the right of publicity from the privacy rights protected by § 3344. But see
supra text accompanying note 61.
81. § 990(a). "'Deceased personality' means any natural person whose name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of his or her death,
whether or not during the lifetime of that natural person the person used his or her name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness on or in products, merchandise or goods, or for
purposes of advertising or selling, or solicitation of purchase of, products, merchandise,
goods or service." § 990(h).
82. § 990(a).
83. Id.
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However, section 990 differs from section 3344 in that it specifi-
cally designates the rights it creates as property rights.' It makes
these rights freely transferable by contract, trust, or testamentary doc-
ument,85 whether or not the deceased personality commercially ex-
ploited one or more of the covered attributes while alive.5 6 Specified
intestate successors may exercise the deceased personality's rights if
they are not otherwise transferred. 7 Similar to copyright, the rights
expire fifty years after the personality's death.a8
The use of the deceased personality's attributes, unlike section
3344, need not be knowing to be actionable under section 990. To
recover damages, however, any licensee or successor to the rights
must have registered a claim with the California Secretary of State
describing the rights claimed 9 before the unauthorized use.90
B. Common Law
While any Californian can sue under section 3344, only those in-
dividuals whose public recognition makes them "commercially ex-
ploitable" can claim infringement of their common law right of
publicity.9' A celebrity's publicity rights under California common
law, however, differ little from a non-celebrity's privacy rights, since
California courts continue to rely on privacy precedents in publicity
cases.92 Both are grounded in Prosser's tort of appropriation.
93
In accord with appropriation cases under the privacy umbrella,
courts have held that the common law right of publicity protects a
celebrity during life from the nonconsensual use 94 of his name, photo-
84. § 990(b). The second Assembly amendment of S.B. 613 categorized all the rights
as property rights. When the legislature split the changes into two sections, however, the







91. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
92. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. App. 1983). See
also Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431 ("The protection of name and likeness from unwarranted
intrusion or exploitation is the heart of the law of privacy.").
93. See Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428-29.
94. Privacy precedents suggest consent can be either written or oral. Weinstein, supra
note 63, at 440. A court following privacy precedents also could find waiver or relinquish-
ment of the right, or of some aspect thereof, from the conduct of the parties or the circum-
stances. Id. (citing Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P.2d 491, 496 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1939)).
1993] CALIFORNIA RIGHTr OF PUBLICITY
graph, or likeness.95 Eastwood v. Superior Court also indicates courts
will extend protection to voice and signature,96 although no California
appellate court has reported a decision involving the unauthorized use
of either.97
Further, common law protection may not be limited to these par-
ticular attributes. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, the California
Supreme Court held that the common law right of publicity protects a
celebrity's "personality." 98 Since Universal used Lugosi's likeness,
however, this holding is not considered authority for creating an ac-
tionable right of publicity outside that context.99 The concurring jus-
tices in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, Inc., decided
immediately after Lugosi, specifically reserved determining whether
the right of publicity would attach to a celebrity's "personality," due
to the difficulty in discerning "any easily applied definition for this
amorphous term."'" Although courts of appeal have suggested
otherwise, the Lugosi holding and accompanying dicta suggest that
common law may protect celebrities to a greater extent than the
statute.' 0'
95. See, e.g., Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431; Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347. "Likeness"
appears to refer to a fairly exact copy of another's features. For example, a dracula charac-
ter that unmistakably bore the plaintiff's features could constitute sufficient appropriation
to be the subject of a right of publicity action, while a generic dracula, which might resem-
ble the plaintiff in many ways, would not. See Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 427-28
96. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346 n.6.
97. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1402 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993) (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
98. At least this is how the California Supreme Court characterized the Lugosi deci-
sion in Guglielmi, decided immediately after Lugosi. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979) (en banc); accord Fairfield v. American Photocopy
Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) ("[T]he exploitation of another's
personality for commercial purposes constitutes one of the most flagrant and common
means of invasion of privacy.").
Lugosi also has been interpreted as establishing that an actor has a strong claim to the
exclusive use of a fictional role he has created. KBG, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 164 Cal. Rptr.
571, 580 (Ct. App. 1980). However, a strong showing is necessary to restrict an allegedly
infringing performance where rights to a stage character are at issue. Id. at 581.
99. Weinstein, supra note 63, at 438.
100. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 457 n.5.
101. Compare Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983)
("The differences between the common law and statutory actions [for commercial appro-
priation] are: (1) Section 3344, subdivision (a) requires a knowing use whereas under case
law, mistake and inadvertence are not a defense against commercial appropriation; and (2)
Section 3344, subdivision (g) expressly provides that its remedies are cumulative and in
addition to any provided by law.") (citations omitted) with Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,
603 P.2d 425, 428 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (noting that Prosser's appropriation "has been
complemented legislatively by Civil Code section 3344, adopted in 1971") (emphasis
added).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 16:151
CALIFORNIA RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
In addition, common law may prohibit more forms of unauthor-
ized use than section 3344 prohibits."° Prior cases, unlike section
3344, do not limit actionable appropriations to those in which the un-
authorized use is for advertising or sale of goods and services.' 03 The
Guglielmi opinion, in fact, suggests any unauthorized use would in-
fringe the common law right of publicity.1°4 The concurring opinion
in Guglielmi and dicta in other cases, however, envision a significantly
more circumscribed right, considering appropriation actionable only if
done for commercial purposes. 05
Another distinction is that California common law, unlike section
3344, imposes strict liability on a defendant.1°6 Inadvertence and mis-
take are not defenses.' 7 Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., an early
invasion of privacy case based on an alleged name appropriation, sug-
gests that a defendant's intent to refer to someone other than the
plaintiff may not preclude liability.' In Kerby, the court held that an
appropriation would be actionable if someone could reasonably con-
strue the appropriated attribute as belonging to the plaintiff. °9
California common law also may differ from section 3344 in the
availability and calculation of damages. It is unclear under common
law whether a plaintiff can recover damages based on both the harm
102. The Eastwood court, in dictum, noted that privacy precedents do not constrain the
types of commercial exploitations that may be actionable under either the privacy or pub-
licity rubric. 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347. The significant countervailing consideration is the First
Amendment. See supra note 52.
103. See, e.g., Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 ("A common law cause of action for
appropriation... may be pleaded by alleging... appropriation.., to defendant's advan-
tage, commercially or otherwise.") (emphasis added). Also, as under § 3344, the unauthor-
ized use need not suggest the celebrity's endorsement to be actionable. Maheu v. CBS, 247
Cal. Rptr. 304, 312 (Ct. App. 1988).
104. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 455.
105. See id. at 457 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (complaint states common law cause of ac-
tion if: (1) plaintiff has "a right of publicity in the commercial uses of his name.., and (2)
[defendant's] conduct constituted an impermissible infringement on that right ") (emphasis
added). Similar to § 3344, common law appears to require some connection between the
use of the attribute and the commercial purpose. Id. at 461 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (unau-
thorized use of name in advertising that was collateral to a constitutionally protected unau-
thorized use not actionable).
106. Miller, supra note 59, at 659.
107. Id.
108. 127 P.2d 577 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
109. Id. at 581. In Kerby, the defendant movie studio produced a movie whose chief
character was a fictional "Marion Kerby." To promote the film, it sent suggestive letters on
pink paper to approximately 1,000 Los Angeles males. The plaintiff, Marion Kerby, was a
little-known actress, unassociated with the film and unknown to the studio. The court
found that "[tihe letter did, in fact, refer to plaintiff in clear and definite fashion, and
would reasonably have been so understood by anyone who knew of her existence." Id.




to himself and the profits to the defendant."' Cases indicate that
measures of damages include lost compensation and harm to reputa-
tion.11" ' Further, neither case holdings nor dicta forecloses mental dis-
tress damages, despite the celebrity's overwhelming commercial
interest. Instead, dicta contemplates mental distress awards may be
proper in some instances." 2 Privacy precedents also support the
availability of punitive damages."' In addition, injunctive relief is
available in appropriate circumstances.
14
In defining the character of the right, the California Supreme
Court agreed with Prosser; the court thought it pointless to debate
whether the common law right of publicity was "property." 1 5 What
the court held was that the right is "personal to the artist."1 6 The
import of this holding appears to be that, unlike the rights created by
section 3344, the common law right of publicity can be assigned by the
celebrity." 7 The right, however, "must be exercised, if at all, by [the
celebrity] during his lifetime" ''"8 and it expires on the celebrity's
death." 9 It does not descend to the celebrity's heirs, as do the rights
created by section 990, but instead enters the public domain.' 20
The situation appears to change if the celebrity associates himself
with products or services during his life and impresses them with a
110. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 352 n.10 (Ct. App. 1983).
111. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438-39 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissent-
ing); accord Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Ct. App. 1969); Fairfield v. American
Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
112. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 439 n.11 (Bird, C.J., dissenting); accord Stilson v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Ct. App. 1972); Fairfield, 291 P.2d 194.
113. See, e.g., Leavy v. Cooney, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580 (Ct. App. 1963).
114. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428.
115. Id. at 431.
116. Id.
117. In so holding, the Lugosi court "produced a particularly anomalous result, in that
despite the classification of the exploitation right as a personal one, the court acknowl-
edged that the right is assignable, stating that '[a]ssignment of the right ... by the "owner"
thereof is synonymous with its exercise.'" Maria E. Levine, Note, The Right of Publicity as
a Means of Protecting Performers' Style, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REV., 129, 136 n.36 (1980) (quot-
ing Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431) (alterations in original). See also Michael J. McLane, The
Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption and First Amendment Myths
Threatening to Eviscerate a Recognized State Right, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 415, 418 (1983).
But see Halpern, supra note 9, at 1223 n.134, suggesting that in view of the California
Supreme Court decisions in Lugosi and Guglielmi, which stress the personal nature of the
right, "a court might hold that a living celebrity does not have a right of publicity that he
may assign exclusively to others."
118. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431.
119. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)
(holding "the right [of publicity] is not descendible and expires upon the death of the
person so protected").
120. See generally David Lange, Recognizing Public Domain, 44 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. (No. 4) 147, 153-56 (1981).
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"secondary meaning."'' Dictum suggests this creates inheritable
property. 122 The law of unfair competition, however, not the common
law right of publicity, defines the rights of the heirs.123
III
Ninth Circuit Interpretation
Federal courts follow applicable state law unless a federal ques-
tion is at issue.' 24 When a state's highest court has not faced an issue,
a federal court must decide a diversity case as it believes the state's
highest court would have decided it.125 Since the California Supreme
Court has not addressed a right of publicity case since 1979, the Ninth
Circuit has developed its own body of "California" law.'26 Although
many Ninth Circuit holdings comport with California precedents, re-
cent decisions such as Waits and White, which emphasize a celebrity's
"property" interest in her "identity," go beyond and even contradict
California law as interpreted by California courts. 27
121. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428.
122. Id. at 428-29.
123. Id. at 428. See also Patrick J. Heneghan & Herbert C, Wamsley, The Service Mark
Alternative to the Right of Publicity: Estate of Presley v. Russen, 14 PAC. L.J. 181 (1983).
Heneghan and Wamsley opined:
Throughout the [Lugosi] opinion the court took judicial notice of the fact that,
during his lifetime, Lugosi had never exploited his name or likeness in connection
with any business, product, or service. The court postulated that Lugosi could
have exploited his right of publicity if he had sold "commercial tie-ups," such as
endorsements or licenses to his name, face, or likeness.
The court's extensive discussion about exploitation leads one to conclude
that the court would have been compelled to find a survivable right of publicity if
Lugosi had exploited his right of publicity during his lifetime. This conclusion is
erroneous. The exploitation discussion was predicated at the outset of the opin-
ion on an understanding of California unfair competition laws. Stated simply, the
Lugosi court said that the right of publicity will not survive in any circumstance;
however, in the event that the individual's name has achieved a "secondary mean-
ing" in the public's eyes, then the individual's estate or heirs may raise an unfair
competition claim.
Id. at 190 n.67 (citations omitted) (quoting Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431 n.5).
124. Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
125. Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Jefferson, 628 F. Supp. 502, 510 (D. Del. 1986). According
to Judge Jerome Frank, the "creator" of the right of publicity, the test should be: "What
would be the decision of reasonable intelligent lawyers, sitting as judges of the highest...
court, and fully conversant with [state] 'jurisprudence?"' Cooper v. American Airlines,
149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945).
126. Because the Ninth Circuit decisions are only each court's interpretations of Cali-
fornia law, their holdings are persuasive, rather than binding precedents on California
courts. In addition, because White is only a pre-trial ruling, the court's finding that the
California common law right of publicity may be present is not a ruling on the merits.
127. This recent approach contrasts with that of the first federal district court to face a
California right of publicity action. See Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F.
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A. Waits v. Frito-Lay, InC. 128
Waits's suit arose from a radio commercial created by Frito-Lay's
advertising agency, Tracy-Locke, and broadcast in September and Oc-
tober 1988.129 The Tracy-Locke jingle introducing Frito-Lay's Sal-
saRio Doritos mirrored the word play of a Waits song, "Step Right
Up.", 3 0
Although not a superstar, Tom Waits is a singer who has achieved
both commercial and critical success in his career.13 ' His "raspy, grav-
elly singing voice" is his distinctive attribute; a fan has described it "as
'like how you'd sound if you drank a quart of bourbon, smoked a pack
of cigarettes and swallowed a pack of razor blades .... Late at night.
After not sleeping for three days."1
32
Waits has not limited his public exposure to recording and movie
contracts or concert appearances. 33 He has sought additional public-
ity, among other things, by appearing on late night television. 34 Un-
like many other entertainers, however, Waits does not perform in
commercials.135 His philosophy is that commercials detract from a
singer's artistic integrity.1
36
Since Waits's policy on commercials was well known, Tracy-
Locke did not try to hire Waits to perform the Doritos commercial.'
37
At the same time, Tracy-Locke and Frito-Lay were not content with
using someone who could just duplicate the feeling of "Step Right
Up.' 1 38 They continued auditioning until they found a musician who
had "consciously perfected an imitation of Waits's voice.'
1 39
Waits was "shocked"" when he heard the advertisement and
"realized 'immediately that whoever was going to hear this and obvi-
Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal.) (1958). Strickler, who was represented by Melville B. Nimmer, admit-
ted that the right of publicity had "not as yet received recognition in California." Id. at 70.
Given that admission, the federal district court did "not feel it wishe[d] to blaze the trail to
establish in California a cause of action based upon the right of publicity." Id. The court
did, however, uphold Strickler's complaint for invasion of privacy.
128. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047
(1993).
129. Id. at 1098.







137. Id. at 1097-98.
138. Id. at 1097.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1098.
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ously identify the voice would also identify that [Tom Waits] in fact
had agreed to do a commercial for Doritos."" 4 ' He filed suit for
"voice misappropriation" under California common law.'42 The jury
found in his favor and awarded him $100,000 for the fair market value
of his services, $200,000 for injury to his peace, happiness, and feel-
ings, and $75,000 for injury to his goodwill, professional standing, and
future publicity value. Waits also received $2 million in punitive dam-
ages. 143 Frito-Lay appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
Waits did not sue under section 3344 for unauthorized use of his
voice. This is probably because in Midler v. Ford Motor Company, the
Ninth Circuit had held that section 3344 protects only against use of a
person's actual voice, not its imitation. 144 The Midler court did deter-
mine, however, that in California "a well-known singer with a distinc-
tive voice has a property right in that voice., 145 It therefore held:
"[W]hen a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known
and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have
appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a [common law]
tort in California.' 46 Applying the same rationale to Waits, the court
found his claim to be "one for invasion of a personal property right:
his right of publicity to control the use of his identity as embodied in
his voice.'
'1 47
The court affirmed Waits's judgment, rejecting the defendants'
argument that the jury had received inadequate instructions on the
elements of "voice misappropriation" articulated in Midler-distinc-
tive voice, widely known, deliberately imitated, for commercial pur-
poses. 48 The court reserved ruling on an additional element of the
"Midler formula" implicitly added by the trial court-actual confu-
sion-because the validity of the instruction was not at issue on
appeal.
49
The court also rejected the defendants' objections to the damage
awards, 5 ° including the argument that the only damages available in a
141. Id. (alteration in original).
142. Id. Waits also alleged and prevailed upon a claim for false endorsement under the
Lanham Act. Id.
143. Id. at 1103.
144. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1513, 1514 (1992).
145. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1105 (discussing Midler, 849 F.2d at 463).
146. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
147. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100.
148. Id. at 1100-02.
149. Id. at 1101 n.3.
150. Id. at 1103-06.
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right of publicity action are for economic injury.' 5' While the court
found that the harm to a celebrity often may be solely economic,
Waits's "shock, anger, and embarrassment" and his humiliation at be-
ing made to look like an "apparent hypocrite" were sufficient to sup-
port a mental distress award. 52
B. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Ina.1
53
In contrast with Tom Waits, Vanna White actively markets herself
to advertisers to capitalize on her fame from her role as hostess on the
Wheel of Fortune game show.'5 4 Her dispute arose from a series of
humorous print advertisements prepared by Samsung's advertising
agency, David Deutsch Associates. 155 Each featured a currently pop-
ular item or personality and a Samsung electronic product on a
twenty-first century set.'
56
The advertisement to which White objected featured a robot at-
tired in a gown, wig, and jewelry that the advertising agency intention-
ally chose "to resemble White's hair and dress.' 1 57 In addition, "[t]he
robot was posed next to a game board which is instantly recognizable
as the Wheel of Fortune game show set, in a stance for which White is
famous. The caption of the ad read: 'Longest-running game show.
2012 A.D."' 1 58 Those associated with the ad called it the "Vanna
White" ad. 59
Unlike other celebrities who appeared in ads in the series, Sam-
sung neither paid White nor obtained her consent." 6 White, there-
fore, filed suit for appropriation of her likeness under Civil Code
section 3344 and the California common law right of publicity.
161
When the district court granted Samsung summary judgment on each
claim, White appealed to the Ninth Circuit.'
62
151. Id. at 1103.
152. Id.
153. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2443 (1993).







161. Id. Similar to Waits, White also asserted and was allowed to proceed with a claim
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id.
162. Id. at 1396-97.
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The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the robot was
not a likeness of White within the meaning of section 3344.163 How-
ever, it rejected the district court's conclusion that the Eastwood deci-
sion mandated dismissing White's common law claim."6 The district
court had interpreted Eastwood as holding that one could plead viola-
tion of the California common law right of publicity only by alleging
appropriation of name or likeness. 165 The appellate court contended
that name or likeness merely illustrated the means by which appropri-
ations could be effected, rather than limited them.16 6 The court sup-
ported its determination with the Midler court and Prosser's
suggestions that appropriation could take place, without use of name
or likeness, by impersonation. 67 The court also relied on an earlier
Ninth Circuit decision, Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.,168 which concluded that California appellate courts would protect
an individual's proprietary interest in her own "identity.'
' 69
163. Id. at 1397. The court reserved "deciding for all purposes when a caricature or
impressionistic resemblance might become a 'likeness."' Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. According to the White court, the Eastwood court had "stated that the com-
mon law right of publicity cause of action 'may be pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant's
use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to de-
fendant's advantage, commercial or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting in-
jury."' Id. (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit said that the district court's dismissal of
White's complaint for failure to satisfy the second prong was inappropriate because the
Eastwood court had not held that the right of publicity cause of action could only be
pleaded in that way. Id. What the Eastwood court actually said was: "A common law
cause of action for appropriation of name and likeness may be pleaded ... ," which is more
supportive of the court's conclusion than its quoted language. Eastwood v. Superior Court,
198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added).
167. White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
168. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). Mot-
schenbacher was a suit by a professional race car driver for the unauthorized use of a
slightly altered photograph of his race car in a Winston cigarette advertisement. Although
he was driving the car when photographed, his features were not visible in the picture. The
court, however, held this did not preclude finding that the driver was identifiable from the
car's distinctive decorations. Id. at 827.
Unlike the White court, the Motschenbacher court reasoned to its holding by careful
and extensive review of California precedents. The court's holding rested specifically on
the fact that the car's "markings were not only peculiar to the plaintiff's car but they
caused some persons to think the car in question was the plaintiff's and to infer that the
person driving the car was the plaintiff." Id.
Like Prosser, Judge Frank, and the Lugosi court, the Motschenbacher court was indif-
ferent to whether the interest it found in "identity" was "property." "We only determine
that [California courts] would recognize such an interest and protect it." Id. at 825-26.
169. Id. Motschenbacher also was a cornerstone of the Midler and Waits decisions. See
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047
(1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1513, 1514 (1992). One commentator suggests that Motschenbacher is analogous to an ac-
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Thus, in contrast with Waits, the White court did not limit itself to
considering White's "property" right to any specific attribute. 70 In-
stead, it framed her right, like the Motschenbacher court had, as one
to her "identity."'' In the view of the court, "[t]he law protects the
celebrity's sole right to exploit [the value of her identity] whether the
celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a
combination thereof.'
'1 72
The core of the court's holding was that California common law
gives a celebrity control over more than a "laundry list" of attrib-
utes. 173 The court's reasoning was that the more popular the celebrity,
the easier it is to evoke the celebrity's identity without using her
name, likeness, or voice. 174 It suggested that the means used were at
issue only to determine whether appropriation of identity had actually
occurred.175 What established White's identity, in the court's opinion,
was the Wheel of Fortune set.'76
Judge Alarcon dissented, arguing that the court had reached be-
yond California precedents. 77 He criticized the majority for creating,
rather than applying, California law.
178
Judge Alarcon made two main arguments against "the majority's
innovative extension of the [California common law] right of public-
tion for appropriation of likeness. Christopher Pesce, Note, The Likeness Monster: Should
the Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 782, 801 (1990).
170. White, 971 F.2d at 1398.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1399.
173. Id. at 1398.
174. Id. at 1399.
175. Id. at 1398. In so holding, White moved well beyond Motschenbacher, Midler, and
Waits in suggesting the possibility of recovery where the potential for actual confusion or
consumer deception did not exist. See also Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (taking a similar approach to the use of the phrase "Here's
Johnny").
176. White, 971 F.2d at 1399. While the majority admitted that considered separately,
the robot's physical attributes, its dress, and its stance "say little," it held for White,
reasoning:
Viewed together, they leave little doubt about the celebrity the ad is meant to
depict. The female-shaped robot is wearing a long gown, blond wig, and large
jewelry. Vanna White dresses exactly like this at times, but so do many other
women. The robot is in the process of turning a block letter on a game-board.
Vanna White dresses like this while turning letters on a game-board but perhaps
similarly attired Scrabble-playing women do this as well. The robot is standing on
what looks to be the Wheel of Fortune game show set. Vanna White dresses like
this, turns letters, and does this on the Wheel of Fortune game show. She is the
only one.
Id.
177. Id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1403 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
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ity.' 79 The first argument was that the California common law right
of publicity differed from section 3344-protecting name, voice, signa-
ture, photograph, and likeness-only in the remedies and defenses
available. 80 The second argument was that when the legislature
amended section 3344 ten years after the Motschenbacher decision to
add voice and signature, it did not add a cause of action for appropria-
tion of "identity."'' Judge Alarcon considered this a "clear implica-
tion" that the legislature "wished to limit the cause of action to
enumerated attributes.'1
8 2
Although Judge Alarcon's thesis would appear to undermine
Midler and Motschenbacher,183 he distinguished these decisions be-
cause in each case "the advertisement affirmatively represented that
the person depicted . . . was the plaintiff."'8 He suggested "that
where identifying characteristics unique to a plaintiff are the only in-
formation as to the identity of the person appearing in an ad, a triable
issue of fact has been raised as to whether his or her identity has been
appropriated."'8 5 Judge Alarcon, however, found "nothing unique
about Vanna White or the attributes which she claims identify her."'8 6
Thus, while agreeing that the ad would remind readers of Vanna
White, he did not find that it depicted her. 8 7 In Judge Alarcon's view,
the ad depicted a robot playing White's Wheel of Fortune role.1
88
IV
Comparing and Reconciling "California" Law
Even though no California court has imposed liability for unau-
thorized use of a celebrity attribute other than name, photograph, or
likeness, this does not mean that the California common law right of
publicity is so constrained. 8 9 As Eastwood and Judge Alarcon sug-
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 n.6 (Ct. App.
1983)); see also supra note 101. Judge Alarcon also noted that not only had no California
court granted recovery for appropriation of "identity," but no California court had found a
right of publicity infringement involving other than name or likeness. Id. at 1402.
181. Id. at 1403.
182. Id.
183. This also would be true of Waits. However, since Waits was decided one week
later, it was not addressed.
184. White, 971 F.2d at 1404.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1405.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 571, 579 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1942) ("New sets of facts are continuously arising to which accepted legal principles must
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gest, common law protection should extend at least as far as section
3344 (i.e., to voice and signature)."9 Further, despite Eastwood's ex-
planation of the limited differences between section 3344 and com-
mon law, cases imply that the scope of the common law right of
publicity extends beyond the bare words of section 3344 and their
prior common law construction. 191 California precedents do not, how-
ever, suggest these rights are property rights.
1 92
Using Waits and White as examples, 93 this section compares the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the California common law right of
publicity with the interpretation suggested by its historical back-
ground, California precedents, and policy considerations.
A. Scope
1. Historical Background
The architects of the privacy and publicity doctrines did not imply
that a "laundry list of specific means ' 194 of appropriation would ade-
quately encompass all the mental and commercial interests they
sought to protect. On the contrary, they expected that the law would
adapt and grow to meet new situations.195
be applied and the novelty of the factual situation is not an unscalable barrier to the appli-
cation of the law.").
190. See supra notes 101, 180 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
193. Waits and White are good examples because, as the district court in White con-
cluded, neither involved a "traditional" California commercial appropriation (i.e., unau-
thorized use of a celebrity's name, picture, or visual likeness). White v. Samsung Elecs.,
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993). In fact, neither
involved the use of any actual attribute. Instead, in each, an advertiser pirated "identity"
by evoking the celebrity's most recognizable attribute-Waits's voice and White's image.
The cases also offer remarkable contrast. The advertisers employed means of evoca-
tion at opposite ends of a spectrum. The appropriation in Waits was direct. Although
Frito-Lay used someone else's voice in the commercial, the voice used was indistinguish-
able from Waits's voice. The appropriation in White, on the other hand, was more remote.
Samsung combined otherwise indistinguishable elements-hair and attire-in an identifi-
able context (the Wheel of Fortune set) to create her overall image.
The two cases also differ in the interests impacted. The appropriation in White in-
fringed solely on White's commercial interest, while the gist of Waits's injury was at least as
much mental as commercial.
194. Id. at 1398.
195. See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23. "That the individual shall have full
protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has
been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such
protection." Id. at 193. "Indeed, the elasticity of our law, its adaptability to new condi-
tions, the capacity for growth, which has enabled it to meet the wants of an ever changing
society and to apply immediate relief for every recognized wrong, have been its greatest
boast .... Id. at 213 n.1.
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However, they balanced the desire for adaptability with the un-
derstanding that privacy and publicity rights must have limits.196 This
was particularly true where celebrities or other public figures were
concerned.' 97 Prosser, as well as Warren and Brandeis, used iden-
tifiability of the representation as one of the significant criteria to dis-
tinguish what was actionable from what was not. 98
Use of identifiability as a criterion strongly supports a finding for
Waits. 199 In Waits, the jury found the imitation was good enough to
convince listeners that Waits sang the commercial. 200 Thus, imitating
Waits's voice was nothing less than impersonating him. Prosser him-
self suggested impersonation would be actionable, without using name
or likeness, if identifiability existed.20 '
196. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 29, at 422-23.
It is evident.., that, by the use of a single word supplied by Warren and Bran-
deis, the courts have created an independent basis of liability... that ... has been
expanded ... without any plan, without much realization of what is happening or
its significance, and without any consideration of its dangers.... [Ilt is high time
we realize what we are doing, and give some consideration to the question of
where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt.
In dissenting from the Ninth Circuit's order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing
White en banc, Judge Kozinski agreed:
Something very dangerous is going on here [in White]. Private property, in-
cluding intellectual property, is essential to our way of life. It provides an incen-
tive for investment and innovation; it stimulates the flourishing of our culture; it
protects the moral entitlements of people to the fruits of their labors. But reduc-
ing too much to private property can be bad medicine. Private land, for instance,
is far more useful if separated from other private land by public streets, roads and
highways. Public parks, utility rights-of-way and sewers reduce the amount of
land in private hands, but vastly enhance the value of the property that remains.
So too it is with intellectual property. Overprotecting intellectual property is
as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public
domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Cul-
ture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, and each new creator build-
ing on the works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the very
creative forces it's supposed to nurture.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting) (citing Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Indi-
vidualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556-57 (1993)).
197. See Nimmer, supra note 2, at 216-17; Prosser, supra note 29, at 415; Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 23, at 216.
198. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 29, at 404-05 ("[T]here is no liability for the publica-
tion of a picture of [the plaintiffs] hand, leg and foot ... with nothing to indicate whose
they are."); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 206 n.1 ("It is clear that a thing must be
capable of identification in order to be the subject of exclusive ownership.").
199. As the Midler court noted: "A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The
human voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested." Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513, 1514 (1992).
200. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993).
201. Prosser, supra note 29, at 403.
1993]
White's argument on identifiability is less persuasive. As the
White majority admitted, the wigged and gowned robot, viewed sepa-
rately, could evoke many women other than Vanna White. 20 2 Only
the Wheel of Fortune game board supplied the "context or addition of




Existing California law similarly suggests holding for Waits and
dismissing White. For example, in testing Waits's claim, section 3344's
protection of "voice" and "likeness" could be read together to include
vocal impersonations. 2° The Waits court did not consider this alterna-
tive because in Midler the Ninth Circuit found section 3344 protected
only a person's actual voice. 20 5 The Midler court refused to expand
upon the California courts' interpretation of "likeness" as a visual
image.206
While facially correct, this construction ignores the fact that no
California court has construed "likeness" since the legislature in-
cluded voice in section 3344207 and that California appellate courts
have held unauthorized use of "like" names to be actionable. For ex-
ample, in Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., the court held that liability
attached if someone reading a name could reasonably understand it to
be the plaintiff's. 20 8 In a related context, a California appellate court
denied actor Eugene Weingand's petition to change his name to "Pe-
ter Lorie" because it viewed adopting the "like" name as an attempt
to "cash in" on actor Peter Lorre's reputation.20 9
In Waits, where intent to evoke the singer's voice was clear, the
argument for imposing liability is even more forceful. The Waits jury
was not instructed it could find liability merely if the voice in the
Frito-Lay commercial was like or could reasonably be understood to
202. See supra note 176.
203. Prosser, supra note 29, at 403-04.
204. See Wohl, supra note 53, at 455. Construed this way the appropriation also would
be actionable under § 3344. Of course in reading "likeness" together with voice, prior
construction of "likeness" as a fairly exacting replication could not be ignored. This should
be satisfied by the facts of Waits.
205. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1513, 1514 (1992).
206. Id.
207. Nurmi v. Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775, 1777 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
208. 127 P.2d 577, 581 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942). Section 3344 adopts a similar type of
"reasonable" determination as to whether use of a person's photograph is actionable. See
supra note 64.
209. See In re Weingand, 41 Cal. Rptr. 778 (Ct. App. 1964).
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be Tom Waits's; the jury instruction required that "people who were
familiar with plaintiff's voice who heard the commercial believed
plaintiff performed it."
210
In contrast, no one looking at the Samsung robot could believe it
was Vanna White. The robot's "features," excepting the wig and the
gown, were mechanical and did not bear the exacting resemblance re-
quired to support a "likeness" action.21" ' Dismissal also would be con-
sistent with Kerby, since it is unlikely a juror could reasonably
understand the robot to actually be any person, much less White.21 2
The actual confusion that existed in Waits is not even an issue in
White.213
To hold for White under California precedents requires equating
the interest the court found White had in her "identity" with the inter-
est in "personality ' 214 that Lugosi suggested merits legal protection.
When personality is construed according to one of its dictionary
meanings, "distinctive character," California case law suggests that ap-
propriation may be actionable.21 5 For example, in 1928, a California
appellate court upheld an injunction restraining Charles Amador from
using the name "Charles Alplin" and attiring himself like Charlie
210. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993).
211. See supra notes 65, 95. White's claim might have been more supportable if she
could have sued for appropriation of her "image." However, when amending § 3344 in
1984, the legislature specifically determined not to extend its protection to "image," rein-
forcing the propriety of the dismissal. See supra note 66. As Judge Alarcon pointed out,
the legislature also did not extend § 3344's protection to "identity." See supra text accom-
panying note 181.
212. Kerby, 127 P.2d at 581. Analogy to § 3344's treatment of photographs also applies
here. ("A person shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a photograph when one
• . . can reasonably determine that the person depicted . . . is the same person.")
§ 3344(b)(1) (emphasis added). As Judge Alarcon suggested, what is depicted is a robot
playing Vanna White's role.
213. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993) (no evidence of actual confusion presented).
214. Compare the definition of "identity":
1. state or fact of remaining the same one, as under varying conditions. 2. the
condition of being oneself or itself, and not another.... 3. condition or character
as to who a person or what a thing is .... 4. state or fact of being the same
one.... 5. exact likeness in nature or qualities.
with the definition of "personality":
1. distinctive or notable personal character .... 2. a person as an embodiment of
an assemblage of qualities. 3. Psych. a. all the constitutional, mental, emotional,
social etc. characteristics of an individual. b. an organized pattern of all the char-
acteristics of an individual .... 5. the essential character of a person as distin-
guished from a thing.
THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 599, 904 (1966) (emphasis added).
215. See supra notes 95, 98.
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Chaplin's "Little Tramp" in motion pictures.216 However, the Chaplin
v. Amador court affirmed the injunction only because the defendant
tried to deceive the public into believing that Chaplin was the actual
star and specifically did "not depend on [Chaplin's] exclusive right to
the use of the role, garb, and mannerisms [of the Little Tramp]. 217
Blond hair, big jewelry, and a long gown are not "personality"
comparable to Chaplin's character.218 If they were, any later Wheel of
Fortune hostess would violate White's right of publicity merely by be-
ing blond and wearing the same attire.219 When combined with the
absence of consumer deception, California precedents suggest that
Samsung's "appropriation" should not be actionable.
3. Policy
Policy considerations support comparable results. From the ce-
lebrity's perspective, the goal of the right of publicity-its policy ra-
tionale-is to prevent unauthorized use of the celebrity's attributes
and, failing that, to obtain compensation for such use.220 Assuring ce-
lebrity compensation, however, is a secondary consideration in recog-
nizing a right of publicity.22'
The primary state interest, as in patent and copyright law, is en-
couraging the individual to expend the effort necessary to create
something of value for the public.222 In the celebrity context, this is
216. Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
217. Id. at 546. The court found that Chaplin had created a peculiar type of character
on the motion picture screen:
In this character, Chaplin has generally worn a kind of attire peculiar and individ-
ual to himself, consisting of a particular kind or type of mustache, old and thread-
bare hat, clothes, and shoes, a decrepit derby, ill-fitting vest, tight fitting coat, and
trousers and shoes much too large for him, and with this attire, a flexible cane
usually carried, swung, and bent as he performs his part. This character, and the
manner of dress, has been used and portrayed by Charles Chaplin for so long, and
with such artistry, that he has become well known all over the world in this char-
acter to such an extent that a display of his picture with the word "Charlie," or
even with no name at all, has come to mean the plaintiff.
Id. at 545. But see West v. Lind, 9 Cal. Rptr. 288 (Ct. App. 1960) (although West devel-
oped the role of "Diamond Lil," defendant's use of the name did not create public
deception).
218. California precedent suggests a strong showing is necessary to assert an exclusive
right to a character. See supra note 98.
219. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993) (Alarcon, J., dissenting) ("To say that Vanna White may bring
an action when another blond female performer... appears on such a set as a hostess will,
I am sure, be a surprise to the owners of the show.").
220. Nimmer, supra note 2, at 204.
221. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1977).
222. Id. at 574, 576.
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typically some form of entertainment. 223 The right of publicity also
serves a broader social purpose in preventing unjust enrichment of the
"thief" of the celebrity's "goodwill. ' 224 In addition, where an appro-
priation suggests the celebrity's use or endorsement of a product, the
state has an interest in preventing consumer deception.225
In Waits, each of these policies argues for finding a violation of
Waits's right of publicity. Waits invested his time, energy, and skill
developing a distinctive and distinguishable vocal performance. Frito-
Lay's "conversion" of the sound of his voice was to its benefit and at
Waits's expense. Further, because the imitation was indistinguishable
from his actual voice, it created the false impression that Tom Waits
endorsed SalsaRio Doritos.
In contrast, allowing White to proceed supports none of these
policies. It rewards White merely for being famous,226 not for her cre-
ative efforts.227 Moreover, Samsung's enrichment must be at White's
expense to be "unjust."22 The robot, however, was only identifiable
from the Wheel of Fortune set. Thus, any enrichment was at the ex-
223. Id. at 576.
224. Id.
225. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 839 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
226. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993) (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
227. As the White majority implicitly suggests, awarding White damages would com-
pensate her only for her "dumb luck" at being selected for the Wheel of Fortune hostess
role. Id. at 1399. The attire worn by the robot is not distinctive, distinguishable, or White's
creation. Their combination takes no innovation; as the White majority itself conceded,
many women dress exactly like this. The Wheel of Fortune set, also not White's creation, is
what identifies her.
A recently filed case suggests that policy considerations might not even be served by
making actionable the unauthorized use of traditionally protected attributes, such as name
and likeness, where the person's celebrity status, though the result of her own "creative
energy," is achieved by objectionable or illegal means. Bianchi v. Yronwode, No. CS-92-
312-FVS (E.D. Wash. filed Dec. 15, 1992). In the complaint, Kenneth Bianchi (also known
as the "Hillside Strangler") seeks a share of the profits from the unauthorized use of his
name and caricature on TRue Crime Tading Cards. Hillside Stranger Sues Over Crime
Cards, He Says Sonoma Firm Owes Him Part of Profits Because He Is One of the Featured
Killers, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 16, 1992, available in DIALOG. According to Bianchi, the trad-
ing card maker "'has exploited' his name and violated his rights. In addition, he says the
public may become 'confused' as to who originated the card." Id. In Bianchi's view, in
order to assert a right of publicity action, "[a]ll a person must do is reach a level of fame."
Murderer's Row, CAL. LAw., Mar. 1993, at 20. "His persona has a drawing power, the
value of which gives a public figure the power to sell it." Id.
228. Carson, 698 F.2d at 839 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Blecause a celebrity . . . is
himself enriched by ... things associated with him in which he has made no personal
investment of time, money or effort, another user of such a ... thing may be enriched
somewhat by such use, but this enrichment is not at [the celebrity's] expense." As such,




pense of the show's owners, not White's.22 9 Finally, the ad did not
deceive the public as to White's participation 230 or endorsement.
Samsung's use of the robot may, in fact, suggest the contrary conclu-
sion-that she did not appear because she did not endorse the
product.231
B. Elements/Standing
California courts have never segregated the right of publicity into
"species" as the Ninth Circuit did when it created "voice misappropri-
ation" in Midler.232 However, some elements of the cause of action
articulated in Midler and Waits-"distinctive voice" and "widely
known"-do reflect the substance of California common law princi-
ples.233 "Widely known," for example, suggests the standing neces-
sary to bring a California common law right of publicity action: only
someone whose public recognition makes her commercially exploita-
ble can sue.2 34 Similarly, the combination of "widely known" and
"distinctive voice" implies that the "owner" of the voice must be rea-
sonably identifiable before liability can be imposed.235
In contrast, "knowing" or "deliberate" use is not a necessary ele-
ment of a common law cause of action as Midler and Waits require.236
In fact, the availability of mistake and inadvertence as defenses are
among the clearly recognized distinctions between a section 3344 and
a common law claim.237
C. Property vs. Personal Right
The Ninth Circuit's most significant misreading of California law
was its determination that a celebrity has a property interest in her
identity. This "property" classification originated with the Midler
court's reasoning: "The companion statute [to section 3344 (section
229. White, 971 F.2d at 1405 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 1400.
231. But see id. (because White is well known, likelihood of confusion over her en-
dorsement may be increased).
232. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993) ("The Midler tort is a species of violation of the 'right of publicity."').
233. But see supra notes 104, 166, suggesting the elements of a right of publicity cause
of action in the view of California courts.
234. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Section 990's definition of "deceased
personality" is also in accord.
235. See supra notes 109, 208 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 101, 180 and accompanying text. In reality, however, an imitation
or impersonation by definition incorporates conscious exertion. As such, it may be non-
essential or even redundant to impose intent as a condition of liability to the type of com-
mon law right of publicity claim asserted by Waits.
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990)] protecting the use of a deceased person's name, voice, signature,
photograph or likeness states that the rights it recognizes are 'prop-
erty rights.' By analogy the common law rights are also property
rights. Appropriation of such common law rights is a tort in
California."238
Although Prosser, among others, was indifferent to the "prop-
erty" label,239 it is not at all "clear that, in California at least, a well-
known personality with a distinctive voice has a property right in that
voice," as Waits suggests.2' ° In fact, section 3344 and case law indicate
the opposite may be true.241 Further, when given the opportunity to
alter Lugosi's holding that the right of publicity is "personal to the
artist, ' 242 the legislature specifically rejected "property" characteriza-
tion, at least during the celebrity's life.243
Since the Waits court could have reached the same outcome by
construing "voice" and "likeness" less literally, "property" classifica-
tion should not have been necessary to impose liability.2 " That the
Ninth Circuit resorted to analogizing from section 990, however,
shows how confusing the legislature's asymmetrical approach to the
treatment of living and deceased personalities' rights can be.245 In re-
cent Ninth Circuit cases, the result of this confusion may be "bad
law. ,246
238. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1513, 1514 (1992) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
239. See supra notes 35, 115 and accompanying text.
240. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993).
241. See supra notes 77-79, 115-23 and accompanying text.
242. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
243. See supra notes 80, 84.
244. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 78, 84 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 9.
Judge Kozinski agrees:
The panel's opinion [in White] is a classic case of overprotection. Concerned
about what it sees as a wrong done to Vanna White, the panel majority erects a
property right of remarkable and dangerous breadth: Under the majority's opin-
ion, it's now a tort for advertisers to remind the public of a celebrity. Not to use a
celebrity's name, voice, signature or likeness; not to imply the celebrity endorses
a product; but simply to evoke the celebrity's image in the public's mind .... It's
bad law, and it deserves a long, hard second look.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
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D. Mental vs. Commercial Interest
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit may have proved what was
considered "bad law" was really "good law."247 Although the Waits
court generally took a property-based approach emphasizing the in-
dependent commercial interest of "publicity,"248 it reverted to familiar
California authorities, which emphasize a person's dual commercial
and mental interests, when reviewing the jury's damage awards.249
More than one-half of the compensatory damage award affirmed by
the court was for injury to Waits' peace, happiness, and feelings250
the mental interest protected by the right "to be let alone."
251
Waits therefore shows that the California scheme can be a
strength252 rather than a weakness in recognizing that celebrities re-
tain the mental interest in their "personalities."
247. Advocates of publicity as a property right have often criticized the dual interests-
mental and commercial-encompassed by Prosser's tort of appropriation that forms the
foundation of California law. Some, in fact, have suggested that the duality of protected
interests is the reason publicity doctrine has not developed cohesively. See, e.g., Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, Inc., 603 P.2d 425, 437-39 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983); Halpern, supra note
9, at 1209-11.
248. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
249. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103-06 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1047 (1993); see also supra notes 72-76, 110-14 and accompanying text.
250. The phrasing of Waits's damage award is reminiscent of the first California case
implicitly to recognize the right of privacy, which rested its holding on the California con-
stitutional right to "pursue and obtain happiness." Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1931). See supra note 56.
251. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
252. Even Professor McCarthy suggests that this is the preferred approach if courts can
understand it:
Prosser tried to keep commercial injury... within the framework of his fa-
mous "four torts" of privacy.
But Prosser's effort failed, perhaps because others ... strongly pushed the
concept of the right of privacy as a unified tort ... tied together by the common
denominator of an affront to human dignity. In such a human dignity-centered
right... [c]ommercial injury only found its place outside of the "privacy" frame-
work altogether. But once outside of the "privacy" category, no one would give it
serious consideration until it received a name. And it was Judge Jerome Frank
who finally saw the need and dubbed it the "Right of Publicity."
Undoubtedly, the law today would be more coherent and neat if it had devel-
oped such that courts would recognize a sui generis legal right labeled something
like a "right of identity" with damages measured by both mental distress and
commercial loss. If the law had such a separately entitled category, things would
be considerably easier to sort out compared to our present world of "separate"
rights of privacy by appropriation and a Right of Publicity.
MCCARTHY, supra note 37, at § 1.11[C] (citations omitted).
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Creating Clarity in California Law
If California publicity law is somewhat uncertain, misreading the
law as the Waits and White courts did can only add to that uncer-
tainty.253 In addition, the differing interpretations of California law
between the California appellate courts and the Ninth Circuit create
an opportunity for forum shopping. 254 To reduce confusion and forum
shopping, California must define the scope of the right of publicity
more precisely and reconsider its inconsistent treatment of personal
and property rights. Although the California statute does not parallel
common law as closely as Judge Alarcon suggests,255 it could be
amended to help accomplish this end.256 Statutory change is neces-
sary to eliminate disparate treatment between living and deceased ce-
lebrities and to codify important California precedents into the
statute's "plain meaning." Creating this clarity does not require a
complete statutory overhaul, however, as the means to eliminate the
uncertainty exist in the statutory scheme.
A. Property/Personal Rights
The rights created by section 3344 must be made more symmetri-
cal with those of section 990.257 As the Ninth Circuit implied by anal-
ogizing "property" rights between the two sections,258 it is anomalous
to have a right become statutorily "transformed" at death from unen-
forceable to enforceable in the hands of a third party.259 Assignees of
celebrity attributes should have standing to sue under both section
3344 and common law.
One suggestion is for the legislature to create a mechanism within
section 3344 enabling assignees to register their rights to use statuto-
rily protected attributes, a right the assignees and heirs of deceased
253. See Wohl, supra note 53, at 455-58 (using Ninth Circuit decisions to illustrate Cali-
fornia's "expansive view" of the right of publicity).
254. Since Ninth Circuit treatment is more favorable to plaintiffs, incentive exists to
elect the federal forum, further reducing the ability of California courts to define Califor-
nia common law.
255. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Katherine L. Blanck, Comment, Restricting the Use of "Sound-Alikes" in
Commercial Speech by Amending the Right of Publicity Statute in California, 26 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 911 (1989) (arguing for amendment of California Civil Code § 3344 to include
vocal imitations).
257. See supra notes 77-79, 84-90 and accompanying text.
258. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1513, 1514 (1992).
259. See supra notes 77-79, 84-86 and accompanying text.
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personalities now have under section 990.260 This can be done without
significant administrative burdens by making the registration alterna-
tive available only to assignees of rights. Non-celebrities and celebri-
ties who do not assign their rights would continue to enjoy the current
protection of section 3344.61
This registration mechanism makes sense for several reasons.
Since only those whose attributes have commercial value are likely to
make assignments, celebrities will receive the special considerations
that courts and commentators argue they deserve. Whether or not
one calls the assigned attribute "property, ' 262 registration could create
the third-party enforceability that initially spawned the property ver-
sus personal right debate.263 In addition, with the exception of the
knowing use requirement while the celebrity lives,264 the assignee's
rights would be the same before and after the celebrity's death. Re-
quiring the assignee to register also would place the administrative
burden, like section 990, on the person or entity seeking section 3344's
protection.265
Furthermore, to the extent that the right of publicity serves the
same social purposes as copyright and patent law, registration appears
a particularly apt solution.266 The assignment creates a document (the
contract between the celebrity and the assignee) amenable for use to
describe the rights claimed,267 similar to a copyright application.
Finally, registration would provide an important notice function.
It would not only stake a particularized claim to an attribute, but also
260. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
261. But see, David C. Byers, Copyright to Life: Towards Copyright Protection for
Name and Likeness, CAL. ST. B.J., Feb. 1981, at 52, 54 (suggesting registration of celebrity
attributes under copyright law model as a prerequisite to any judicial enforcement).
262. Felcher and Rubin suggest that designation of publicity rights as property could
have "wide-ranging" effect: "It could imply that the right, like other property rights, is not
only transferable [and devisable], but that it is taxable; that it can serve as a capital asset, or
as security for a loan; and that it should be taken into account in a divorce settlement."
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1593.
263. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
264. The knowing use requirement of § 3344 could be eliminated as well, making
§§ 3344 and 990 identical in this respect. This also would make § 3344 more parallel with
the common law rights of privacy and publicity to which inadvertence or mistake are not
defenses. But see supra note 70.
265. It would be similar to the requirement that a corporation register as a foreign
corporation in a particular jurisdiction prior to instituting suit in that jurisdiction.
266. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,576 (1977) (noting
that the purpose of the right of publicity is closely related to that of copyright law).
267. The rights, of course, would have to be within the scope of § 3344's protection.
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would let the public know from whom consent to its use must be
obtained.2"
B. Scope/Elements/Standing
As the majority and dissenting opinions in White show, courts and
commentators differ materially on how far the right of publicity
should extend. Even without considering the extensive First Amend-
ment concerns, the line between what should and should not be ac-
tionable is difficult to draw.26 9
No one could seriously dispute that Samsung received value by
evoking Vanna White's "identity" in its advertisement.
270 This eco-
nomic reality is what drives many, like the White majority, to contend
that the right of publicity should protect any means an advertiser uses
to evoke a particular celebrity.27 ' Others, however, suggest that this
approach does not distinguish between those aspects of a celebrity's
personality that are worthy of protection and those that are not.
272
California common law precedents-which focus on uniqueness,
reasonable identifiability, and likelihood of confusion 273-reflect this
latter, better-reasoned approach. This approach also comports with
the policies that underlie the right of publicity: stimulating creative
efforts and protecting the public from deception. Further, where the
claim results from use of something merely associated with a celebrity,
the claim of unjust enrichment becomes too weak to justify liability.
274
268. This could create an additional benefit to assignees dealing with celebrities like the
Haelan ballplayer who was generous in granting his "exclusive" rights. See supra note 46.
269. See Pesce, supra note 169, at 799 ("The resolution ... depends on how much
imitation, evocation or invocation is considered too much.").
270. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993) (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
271. Halpern, supra note 9, at 1242-46. This group focuses on what the appropriator
gets, not on what the celebrity gives up, and does not demand that the use be deceptive.
But see White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) ("Intellectual property rights aren't like some constitutional rights, absolute
guarantees protected against all kinds of interference, subtle as well as blatant. They cast
no penumbras, emit no emanations: The very point of intellectual property laws is that
they protect only against certain specific kinds of appropriation.") (citation omitted).
272. Commentators adopting this posture require that the attribute have an independ-
ent commercial value. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 6, at 1614-15. They also suggest
that the advertiser's receipt of value come at the celebrity's expense. See Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 839 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Pesce, supra note 169, at 803.
273. See, e.g., Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 577 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942);
Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928); see also Pesce, supra note 169, at
824 (courts should incorporate Lanham Act's likelihood of confusion requirement into the
right of publicity).
274. Pesce, supra note 169, at 802. One commentator suggests:
19931
The legislature should amend section 3344 to reflect this compro-
mise position.275 This does not require creating species of causes of
action as the Ninth Circuit did with "voice misappropriation."276 It
does require recognition that a person has an interest in her "identity"
or "personality" in the sense that Prosser and Warren and Brandeis
used these words-something that is distinctive, unique and part of
her.
The legislature should make clear that imitations or imperson-
ations of protected attributes are actionable under section 3344, per-
haps by defining "likeness." A cause of action should only accrue,
however, if the imitation/impersonation causes actual confusion or is
reasonably likely to cause actual confusion about a person's
participation.
The legislature also should specifically extend section 3344 to
protect, to the very limited extent common law appears to, distinctive
characters, such as Chaplin's "Little Tramp." '277 Imitators of such dis-
tinctive characters, however, should be subject to liability only when
imitators of other protected attributes would be-where actual or rea-
sonably likely confusion exists. In addition, protection should extend
only to characters developed through the effort and creative energies
of the person seeking recovery.278
Finally, the legislature should extend section 3344's protection to
a very limited class of things associated with a celebrity. This would
potentially encompass appropriations of associated aspects that are
more identifiable in the particular circumstances than the celebrity's
[T]he right of publicity should not be extended to protect things merely associ-
ated with a celebrity, regardless of the direct correlation between their commer-
cial value and that celebrity's success. One of the assumptions underlying the
right of publicity is that the appropriated characteristic is the product of "[the
celebrity's] own talents and energy [and] the end result of much time, effort and
expense." Only then is the enrichment of the appropriator unjust because, in
such a case, he could be said to be enjoying the fruits of another's labor. But
alleged "appropriators" are also entrepreneurs who expend time and talent of
their own to create and market valued commodities. When the right of publicity
protects phrases and objects merely associated with celebrities, it is not always
clear that the interests of a celebrity-or worse, that celebrity's undistinguished
descendant-should outweigh the interests of a commercial entity or
entrepreneur.
Id. at 802-03 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977)).
275. Comparable amendments to § 990 would be appropriate as well.
276. See supra note 232.
277. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 95, 98.
278. Or the person's assignor. A strong showing should be necessary to restrict an in-
fringing performance. See supra note 98.
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name or photograph, for example, might be.27 9 For liability to attach,
the associated aspect should have to be unique, substantially of the
claimant's creation,28 ° and create actual or reasonably likely
confusion.281
Amending section 3344 in these ways will send a strong message
to the federal courts that the California right of publicity is neither as
narrow as the district court in White suggested 28 2 nor as broad as the
Ninth Circuit held in that case.283
VI
Conclusion
Development of the California common law right of publicity has
been confounded by the lack of cases being filed in California courts.
As a result, the Ninth Circuit has created its own body of California
right of publicity law. Some Ninth Circuit holdings contradict Califor-
nia authority. Others have expanded the scope of the California right
of publicity beyond that warranted by its historical background, Cali-
fornia precedents, and policy considerations. California legislative ac-
tion is necessary if California is to control the determination of the
important rights of its celebrities.
279. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821,827 (9th Cir.
1974) (professional race car driver's car was instantly recognizable, whereas a picture of his
face would not have been recognizable).
280. Or that of the claimant's assignor.
281. "Protecting phrases and other things merely associated with an individual provides
virtually no notice to the public at all of what is claimed to be protected .... [Tihe public
is left to act at their peril. The result is a chilling effect on commercial innovation and
opportunity." Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 840 (6th Cir.
1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
282. See supra text accompanying note 165.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
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